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"The negligence action is a form of lottery. In case of 
ind ust r ial accidents it provides i nconsistent solutions 
for less than one victim in every hundred. The Workers' 
Compensation Act provides meagre compensat ion for worke rs, 
but only if their injury occurred at work. The Social 
Security Act will assist with the pressing needs of those 
who remain, provided they can meet the means test. All 
others are left to fend for themselves." 
"Such a fragme nted and capricious response to a soci a l p rob l em 
which cries out for co-ordinated and comprehensive tre atme nt 
cannot be good enough. No economic reason justifies it. It 
is a situation which needs to be changed." 1 
In these words the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compe n sation 
for Personal Injury summed up the situation existing in its 
area of investigation at the time of the inquiry . The tas k o f 
the Royal Commission was to study and report upon the law 
relating to compensation and claims for damages for persona l 
injury by accident, and to recommend such changes as it felt 
were desirable. In the approach later proposed in the Woodhouse 
report, the Royal Commission expressed the opinion that, 
"The community should accept responsibility for all vic tims 
of accident: and if that responsibility is to be fairl y dis-
charged every man should be provided with a fair measure of 
his actual losses Real compensation is the a im , a nd 
in our view injustice by discrimination must be a voided ." 2 
To achieve this end the Accident Compensat i on Act 3was pa s sed 
in 1972 doing away with the common law claim for damages for 
pers o nal injury by accident, and assuming the functi ons o f 
1. 
2 . 
3. 
Report f or the Royal Commission o f Inquiry i nto Compensat~o~ 
fo r Pe r s onal Injury in Ne w Zeal a nd : a t Pa~e 1 9 Pa ra . 1 . 
Herea f t er th i s Report wi l l be r efe rred to as t he Woodhouse 
Report. 
Wood ho us e Repor t , P.1 04 Para . 267 
He reafter r e fe r r ed to as t he Act. U•.W LiBRARY 
V ICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON_ 
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the Workers' Compensation Board 4in respect of personal injuries 
by accident occurring on or after l April 1974. The Act 
was to do away with the anomalies and injustices of the existing 
processes and replace them by a comprehensive scheme operating 
from a basis of consistent principle5 as a form of social 
insurance, not a form of social assistance. 6 
7 Neither the Woodhouse Report nor the Gair Report deemed it 
practical for the State to bear the whole of an injured person's 
losses, and it became a question of which losses should be 
included in the new scheme and how they could be shifted and 
fairly apportioned as between the individual and the State so 
as to make the proposal a viable one. It also had to be decided 
which of the remedies available at common law in this area 
should be adopted by the new scheme. 
8 The White Paper suggested that a preferable alternative to 
the Commission's proposals might be to compensate all accident 
victims on the basis of full indemnity. To effect this, the 
common law measure of damages could be retained although the 
common law action as such need not be so retained. It wa s 
recognised that adoption of this course of action would entail 
considerable administrative difficulty and extra expens e , 
possibly making it impractical as an alternative to the Royal 
Commission's proposal that the personal injury claimant must 
bear part of his own losses. 9 
4. As empowered by the Workers' Compensation Act 1956 
5. Woodhouse Report at page 107, paragraph 278(a) 
6. Woodhouse Report at page 107, paragraph 279(b) 
7. Repor t of the Parliamentary Select Conunittee on Compensat io~ 
for Personal Inquiry in New Zealand . Hereafter referr e d o 
as the Gair Report. 
8. "Pe rsonal Inj ury :A Commentary on the Report of the Inq ui r 1 
into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand ." 
Hereafter referred to as the Whit e Paper. 
9. The White Paper at page 54, paragraph 120 . 
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The p roposal o f the White Pape r in th i s r e gard wa s no t a dopted 
by the,. Act. 
The Gair Report distinguishe d three classes of compensation: 
firstly, for income maintenance, secondly, for non-economic 
losses such as loss of enjoyment of life from physical impairme nt 
or disfigurement and finally, compensation for various special 
expenses; all being for expenditure which has been incurred as 
a result of disablement. 
These classes of compensation are not alternatives and an 
injured person may be entitled to compensation under all three 
categories. 10 It is the last of these cate gories which is the 
concern of section 121 of the Act. h . . d 11 Tat provision rea s 
Compensation for pecuniary loss not related to earnings -
1 Where a person suffers personal injury by accident in 
respect of which he has cove r under this Act, or where 
a person dies as a result o f personal injury so suffere d, 
the Commission, having regard to any other compe nsation 
payable and any rehabilitat ion assistance provided or to be 
provided, may, under this s ubsection, pay to him, or in the 
event of his death to his a J~inistrator, in addition to 
any other compensation and ~ehabilitation assistance to 
which he is entitled under -~ is Act, compensation of s uch 
amount (if any) as it think= fit for actual and r e asonab l e 
expe nses and proved losses cessarily and direc t l y r esulti ~g 
f rom the injury or death, n ~ bei ng -
10 . The Gair Repo r t at page 37, paragr aph 77. 
11. s 121 2, 3 and 4 are i n : lude d in Appendix A of 
this paper. 
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Any expense or loss in respect of damage to 
property; or 
Any expense or loss incurred after the death of that 
person in respect of the administration of his 
estate; or 
c Any expense or loss arising from damage in respect of 
which, or to the extent to which, no payment is to 
be made under subsection 1 or subsection lA or 
section 110 or this Act, by reason, of subsection 
2 of that section; or 
d The loss of an opportunity to make a profit; or 
e Any loss arising from inability to perform a business 
contract; or 
f Any loss that has not for the time being actually 
occurred, whether or not the amount thereof is 
ascertainable before it occurs; or 
g Any expense or loss in respect of or towards payment 
of which compensation is otherwise payable under 
this Act. 
lA Notwithstanding anything in subsection 1 of this section, 
unless(in the opinion of the Commission) there are special 
circumstances that justify a payment being made under that 
subsection, no payment shall be so made in respect of any 
expense or loss if the Commission considers that the expense 
or loss is similar in nature to an expense or loss for which 
compensation is payable under any other provision of this 
Act. 
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No exhaustive list of expenses compensatable under Sec~ion 121 
can be made but such claims as the following have been , e: d 
to 9atisfy the requirements of the section: 
the payment of the airfare to Australia of a doct -
accompanying an accident patient t o his home i n that 
country, 12 
the cost of a housekeeper or household he lp where the 
usual houseperson was incapacitated by injury f rom 
fulrilling that role, though the amount so paid is 
. bl b h . . 13 reviewa e y t e Commission, 
The cost of hired labour to perform heavy work which 
the claimant was incapacitated by injury from performing 
himself, 14 
The cost of clearing overgrown grass and hedges from 
. 15 a section, 
payment of taxi fares for transport of an accident 
victim to and from the Rehabilitation Centre and 
16 Sheltered Workshops 
the cost of furniture removal from one city to another 
in the case of a wife w:10 wanted to live closer to her 
husband, hospitalized after an accident 16 
also the cost of travelling expenses to attend a review 
h . 17 earing 
12 Review decision 76/RD143:unreported. 13 Review decisions:A.C.C. Report May 1976:32 and 33. 14 A.C. Appeal Authority re MarinKovich, A.C.C. Report November 1976:60 
15 A.C. Appeal Authority re Smart A.C.C. Report March 1977: 37 16 Review decision 76/R0047:unreported 17 Review decision 76/R0513:unreported 
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to achieve a proper perspective of the scope of the 
present section 121, 18 the pruvi~ion must be viewed 
in the context of the compensation provided by the Act 
as a whole and against the background of the various 
heads of damages available at common law 
The damages formerly available at common law will be considered 
under two headings: 
those which are covered under the Act; and 
those which are not so covered. 
It should be noted that it is not the writer's intention to 
deal with every possible head of damage available in the area 
of personal injury or death by accident. 
Damages formerly available at common law which are now 
covered under Section 121 of the Act. 
In addition to the obvious types of pecuniary damage such 
as loss of earnings or earning capacity medical, hospital 
and nursing expenses, it is submitted that the following 
types of claim formerly recoverable at common law, will 
also be met under the Act:where a doctor's injuries made it 
necessary for hime to employ an assistant permanently in his 
practice; 19 loss to a household resulting from the inability 
of a ''do-it-yourself" person to continue this money-saving 
. . f . . 20 activity because of incapacity rom an inJury; 
18 
19 
20 
The present Sl21 1 & lA of the Act were subst ituted 
for the original Sl21 l by S22 1 of the Accident 
Compensation Amendment Act 1975. See Appendix B for 
the original provisions. 
Owen V Sykes 19 63 1 K.B. 192 
MeTior V British Transport Commission 1956 1 All E.F . 
578 
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loss of entitleme nt to fr ee l o dg i ngs and food which the 
plaintiff received from her emp l oyer in addition to her wages, 
and which she was prevented from retaining by virtue of personal 
injuries; 21 the fares paid to vi s it an injured spouse in 
hospita1 22 the loss incurred by taking unpaid leave in order to 
be with an injured spouse hospita lised at a distance from his 
23 work; the expenses arising from the injured plantiff's 
inability to complete his own ho u se and having to hire labour 
24 for that purpose; loss arising from inability through injury 
to continue making contributions to a superannuation fund the reby 
d . h d 1 f h 1 · 25 re ucing t e surren er va ue o t e po icy. Section 121 4 
provides for some cover in this last type of situation. 
provision allows the Commission a discretion to pay to a 
This 
dependent of a deceased superannuitant or pensione r compens a t ion 
for any loss of support arising out of the termination or 
reduction in the superannuation payments. 
No mention is made of injuries which do not result in death, 
so the injured person would have to rely on Section 121 1 
to recover in such cases. 
The common law action "per quod servitium amisit" is 
abolished by the Act, 26 along with the cause of action for los s 
of consortium. No provision is made under the Act for compens -
ation under the latter head. Howe ver section 121 2 a provides 
compe nsation for the old per quod cause for any member of t he 
21 Liffen V Wa tson 194 0 1 K.B. 556 
2 2 Hare V British Transp~r t Commi s s ion 1956 1 All E . R. 578 23 McNeill V Johnston e 1 958 3 All E. R. 16 24 Turnstill V Elect r i city Commiss i on W. A. 1965 W. A. R. SO 25 Judd V Hammersmith, West Lo ndo n & S t . Mark 's Hospitals Boa rd of Governors 1 960 1 W.L.R. 328 
26 Se ction 5 2 
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of the injured's or deceased's household who can show a 
quantifiable loss of service resulting from the injury or death. 
Recovery of damages for this relational tort was confined to 
"material loss" at common law. Recovery under the Act requires 
in addition that this material loss can be measured in pecuniary 
terms. 
It must be noted that the test for recovery of damages at 
common law was that the loss occurred as a reasonably foreseeabl e 
consequence of the defendant's negligence. The test of reasonable 
foreseeability is not relevant under Section 121, nor is 
negligence relevant in the context of the Act. 
Therefore, if the above listed common law case s are to receive 
cover under the Act, or more specifically under Section 121, 
they must satisfy the criteria established there. 
for the operation of this provision are threefold: 
The essential s 
a) the expense or loss must necessarily and directly 
result from the injury or death; 
b) the claimant must have cover under the Act for death 
or personal injury by accident; and 
c) the claim must cover actual and reasonable expenses and 
proved losses. 
These prerequisites for the operation of Section 121 require 
further discussion. 
Under the Act the loss must be a necessary and direct result 
of the injury to be recoverable. 
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The notion of directness is not ne w to the law of damages 
d 27 . h d28 l . an appears prior tot e Wagon Moun cases a ong with wo r d s 
such as "necessary," "Natural," and "probable" to divide 
those damages which could be classed as resulting from an injury , 
and those which were too remote. If the damage flowed from an 
independent or extraneous factor the damage is regarde d as 
a direct result. However where there is some intervention, 
the question must be whether it has broken the direct chain o f 
causation between the injury and the damage. 
"Necessary'' is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary as 
"inevitably resulting from the nature of things 
inevitably produced a previous stae of things" "Necessary " 
then is to be construed within a given set of circumstance s. 
It refer ·to those losses which of necessity arose from the 
injury. It is submitted that the word "necessarily" within 
Section 121 has an objective meaning, rather than the 
subjective or personal meaning as was attache d to the words 
"necessary" and "necessarily" by Warrington L.J.
29 
This analysis has treated the words "directly" and "ne c essar ily " 
as separate entities, however Blair J. has directe d tha t they 
be read together as a combined concept. 30 
27 In such cases as re Polemis and Furnes s Withy & Co 
1921 3 K.B. 560; and Bo s tock & Co. Ltd V Nic ho l son 
& Sons Ltd 1904 l KB 725 
28 1961 A.C. 388 
29 Ricke tts V Colquho un 1925 1 K.B. 725 On a ppeal 
1926 A.C. 1 at 7, Lord Blane s b urg h found th is approa h 
wa s not cor rec t , and t he t e r ms were o bjec tively used . 30 A.C. Appe al Autho r ity r e Smart A. C.C. Report March 1977: ,-
{i) 
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The second of the prerequisites to be satisfied under Section 
121 is that the claimant must have cover under the Act for 
death or personal injury by accident. 
Situations which are covered by the phrase 'personal injury by 
accident' are given in section 2 of the Act, but this is not 
an exclusive list. This is followed by a list of situations 
which are not included under that definition. 
Payment under section 121 1 is personal to the person who has 
been so injured, or in the event of his death, to his 
administrator. 
However under section 121 1 b any person can recover expenses 
incurred in helping the injured or deceased person. Such expe ns e s 
include the cost of taking him to hospital by taxi or private 
car, the cost of insertion of funeral notices in the paper when 
the deceased's family was not in New Zealand; and an award 
to a man who deferred starting a new business to care for the needs 
of his injured wife and asthmatic children. 
It is also required that the claim cover actual and reasonable 
expenses and proved losses. This requirement may caus e some 
confusion since it is arguable tht "losses" goes far wider than 
'expenses', in not being limited to pecuniary losses as the 
latter word is. If this is so, the scope of section 121 1 is 
considerably enlarged to include any loss, pecuniary or otherwise , 
provide d that the loss i s proved , o r the e xpense i s a ctual and 
r e asona b l e . 
.. 
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On the other hand, it may be argued that the words ' proved 
losses' are to be read as ejusdem generis with "actual and 
reasonable expenses." The headings to secion 121 certainly 
indicate that this is so, but such headings are not to affect 
the interpretation of the Act. 31 
The Commission, in meeting claims under this section, has applied 
the restricted approach toward the word 'losses' in only 
allowing compensation for those losses which are proved and of 
a pecuniary nature. An illustration of this approach is found 
. h . d f 1 . 32 in t e JU gment o Bair J. 
"the words "proved losses" ... must be given effect to 
... and in order to succeed the claimant must show a 
specific, actual, identifiable amount." 
The use of the word "amount" implies that Blair J. is talk ing 
in terms of pecuniary loss. 
The major heads of non-pecuniary loss from common law are 
retained under the Act. 
Section 120 provides lump sum compensation for pain and suffer i ng, 
past and future, loss of enjoyment of life and loss from dis-
figurement. Loss and impairment of bodily function covered b y 
lump sum awards under Section 119. 
31 Acts Interpre tation Act 1924 SS f 
32 A.C. Appeal Au thority : re Marinkov ich, A. C.C. report Nov . ~976 : ~0 
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This restrictive interpretation of "losses" as referring only to 
pecuniary losses has been adopted by the Commission as a matter 
of policy. It must be noted that most claims lodged under section 
121 do fall into the category of pecuniary losses, but that aside, 
it is submitted that the Commission adopted this approach on 
considerations such as the greater ease of administering a 
provision which allows solely for the recovery of pecuniary losses, 
rather than one encompassing all losses and where value had to be 
assessed for less tangible or quantifiable objects. To remove 
the possibility of recovery for non-pecuniary losses also 
partly admists the susceptibility of the provision to abuse from 
false claims, since the non-pecuniary losses not already covered 
in the Act may be less open to proof. Also the concept of the 
Accident Compensation plan as one of social insurance has some 
bearing on the point, in that this community funded scheme aims at 
compensating all injuries, regardless of fault and cause, by 
assuming a fair proportion, but not all, of the individual's loss. 
Blair J. expressed the purpose of the Act in this way 33 
"Though the Act is a remedial and liberal one, it does 
not purport to be fully compensatory. Its scheme is 
rather to be comprehensive in its cover and practical 
in its application. It aims at giving to all victims 
of accidents a significant part but not all of the loss 
suffered in an accident." 
The Act itself is silent as to the extent of the Compensation 
which it provides 34 
33 A.C. Appeal Authority: 
34 Section 4 1 c 
re Wall, A.C. Report, Jan 1976:1 0 
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"The purposes of this Act shall be ..... to make 
provision for the compensation of .... " 
Another difficulty which may arise in interpreting the third 
prerequisite of section 121 is whether the objectives in "actual 
and reasonable expenses and proved losses" refer to both losses 
and expenses. Do the expenses which satisfy the requirements of 
actual and reasonable, also need proof? 
And do the losses which are proved, also have to be actual 
and reasonable? 
To determine whether the expenses were actual is a question of 
fact: was the expense incurred? There is no difficulty in 
establishing that requirement. 
As to the word reasonable," it is submitted that it has two 
meanings within the context of the provision: 
1. was it reasonable to incur the expense? and, 
2. is the amount of the expense reasonable. 
Both of these requirements must be met before compensat ion will 
be awarded. 
To determine the former question the whole circumstances of the 
claim must be taken into account. This approach was exercised 
in a review decision 35 concerning a claim under section 121 2 b 
where the words "actual and reasonable expenses " also a ppea:::-. 
35 Review decision 74 /ROOD13 :A.C.C. Report, March 1976:32 
(i) 
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A husband who was about to begin a new business deferred that 
venture to stay home and care for his wife, who had suffered a 
serious accident, and to attend to the special needs of his 
asthmatic children. The review officer held that the husband's 
decision to stay at home himself, rather than hiring a housekeeper, 
was a reasonable one given the special requirements of the family. 
The question whether the claim is for a reasonable amount must 
also be decided in the light of all the circumstances of the case. 
A comparison of two review applications illustrates the way this 
test operates. 
36 In one case a woman who broke her arm and was unable to keep 
house because of this and an existing stiff leg, paid a relative 
$160 to housekeep for her for 8 weeks. This application was 
allowed. In the other case, 37 a daughter who injured her leg, 
paid her mother $450 for a month to look after the house and a 
family of 4 children. The Cormnission refused to make full 
reimbursement of this amount, paying out $243 of it. 
On review, this refusal of full reimbursement was upheld on the 
grounds that there was no legal obligation to pay the mother, 
merely a moral obligation, and the Cormnission could not be bound 
by the value placed on it by the person under the obligation. In 
other words, given the circumstances of the case, and the fact that 
it was a relative who assisted in the house rather than a person 
who takes that type of work for wages, th e Commission felt that the 
amount claimed was excessive and used its discretion to pay what 
it considered was a reaonable amount. 
36 Review decision 74 /R00164 :A.C.C. Report, May 1976:32 
37 Review decision 75/R0117:A.C.C. Report, May 1976:33 
-
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After these three prerequisites of section 121 have been satisfi e d 
by a claim, payment does not follow automatically. The Commission 
still has to exercise its discretion in two areas : 
a whether to pay the claimant at all, and 
b if so, the amount of that payment. 
The section says "The Commission ... may pay to him or in the 
event of his death to his administrator .... " Prima facie the 
word "may" is permissive, although there are cases given in 
Maxwe11 38 where the word has been held to be mandatory. However, 
in the light of the wording of the original subsection viz 
"... the Commission shall pay to him etc. . .. " and the fact of 
its later amendment to "may" it is difficult to see how the word 
could be given any meaning other than the permissive one. 
Having decided to make a payment the Commission then can pay 
what it considers a fit amount. The section itself contains two 
controls on the determination of the quantum: 
1) the compensation must be 
i) for actual and reasonable expenses and proved 
losses; 
ii) necessarily and directly ~esulting from the injury 
or death. 
iii) not being any of a list o f express exclusions. 
2) The Commission is directed to ha -2 "regard to any other 
compensation pay able and any r er ,ilitation as s istance provided 
or to be provided." 
38 12 e d. P234 
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In practice, the Conunission considers the claim as a whole in 
reaching a decision under section 121 1. 1 d . . 3 ' In one appea ec1s1on 
for example, Blair J. held that the Conunission had treated the 
appellant liberally on at least one aspect of the total claim 
thereby substantially cushioning his loss "and that as a consequenc E 
of this it is not a case for the exercise of a discretionary 
power ... " This approach was also taken by the Conunission in 
deferring a decision under section 121 1 pending the outcome 
of the claimant's negligence action against the aircraft manufac-
turers in the U.S.A.
40 
Damages formerly available at conunon law and now excluded from 
recoveryunder section 121. 
Pecuniary losses 
Specific provisions in the Act cover a variety of pecuniary 
losses including medical treatment, 41 earnings related compensatioJ 
loss of potential earning capacity43 and funeral expenses. 44 
Where such a section cannot be read as providing for the recovery 
of a given expense falling within its sphere, section 121 is not 
able to fill the void by awarding compensation. Section 121 A 
supports this view. Consider the example of a claim for Chiro-
praetor's fees. Section 111 provides for recovery of the costs 
of listed medical treatments but chiropractic treatment is not 
39 A.C. Appeal Authority:re Marinkovich:A.C.C. Report Novl976: 60 40 A.C.C. Report Jan 1976:9 
41 Section 111 
42 Section 113 
43 Section 118 
44 Section 122 
-
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mentioned in the lists. On the other hand Section 121 allows 
for the recovery of "actual and reasonable expenses ... necessarily 
and directly resulting from the injury." The Commission however 
has directed 45 that chiropractor's fees cannot be seen as a 
reasonable expense under section 121 as the types of medical 
expense which are deemed reasonable and for which the Commission 
is directed to pay the cost are set out exclusively in Section 111. 
It therefore seems that section 121 is available only to cover 
expenses and losses in areas not specifically provided for, and in 
areas not similar to those covered elsewhere in the Act. 
The section 121 lists a number of types of loss which are outside 
the scope of its cover even though they may be reasonable expenses 
and proved losses necessarily and directly resulting from the 
injury or death which it demands. 
The first of these exclusions is of "any expense or loss in 
respect of damage to property." 
Since there is no definition of property in section 2 of the Act, 
the word is to be taken on its general meaning as covering things 
owned and possessions, both real and personal. Section 110 1 c 
allows for the reasonable cost of repair to or replacement of 
clothing or spectacles damaged while being worn at the time of 
an accident. 
45 Review decision 74/R0063:A.C.C. Report, March 1976:32 
Clothing and spectacles are possessions. 
l c inconsistent with section 121 l a 
This makes section 110 
It is submitted that 
the latter provision is to be read as excluding recovery for 
expenses or losses in regard to any damage to property except 
where express provision has been made elsewhere in the Act for 
their recovery. To extend compensation for damage to property 
beyond this point would be to exceed the aims of the Act as 
stated in section 4. The function of the Act is to provide for 
the compensation of personal injury or death by accident. Claims 
for property damage not covered by Section 110 will continue to 
be handled by the courts. This effectively means that the losses 
of some injured people will be dealt with under Section 121 and 
its criterion of necessary and direct consequence whereas the 
property damage of another injured claimant will be decided in the 
courts on the basis of the common law test of reasonable 
foreseeability. 
Although it may arguably be desirable for all actions arising 
out of an injury or death by accident to be dealt with by the 
one agency so ensuring a consistent approach, a speedier and 
cheaper process than the Court system provides, and no administra-
tive double handling, there are such weighty disadvantages to th is 
course as to make it impracticable. The costs potentially 
involved in claims for property damage are very high and it would 
not provide a fair result for claimants if a ceiling were placed 
on the amount recoverable in any one claim. To allow for a 
reasonable percentage of the property claim to be covered might 
produce a result acceptable by comparison with the uncertai n~} 
of the common law action, but again the costs potentially 
required to fund this inclusion would make it infeasible, t he more 
The second exclusion is of "any expense or loss incurred after 
the death of that person in respect of the administration of 
his estate." This exclusion was added by the Amendment Act of 
1975, and has the effect of limiting the type of expense which 
can be claimed as "necessarily and directly resulting from the 
injury or death." In deciding a review application on this point 46 
the Commission held that "the administration of a deceased's estate 
cannot be a necessary action consequential upon the death of the 
deceased person in the terms of the Act. The purposes and scope 
of the Accident Compensation Act are set out in section 4 of the 
Act and we think it is clear that the Act does not envisage the 
Commission paying towards the expenses of administering the 
estates of deceased persons." 
In the facts of the review claim mentioned, a brother had claimed 
the cost of his travel to New Zealand from Britain under Section 121 
2 b , arguing that his trip was necessary for the administration 
of his deceased sister's estate. There are two policy grounds 
for this refusal to meet the claim. Firstly, to allow the costs 
of estate administration would set a precedent and the Commission 
would subsequently be faced with claims for such items as legal 
fees, which would vay in price according to the complexity of the 
estate concerned, the amount of involvement of the legal firm in 
the execution of the estate and the length of time taken to wind 
up the affair. At this point the costs become inextricably bound 
up with the amount of property involved, and that item is outside 
the concern of the Act. 
46 Review decision 74/R00444 A.C.C. Report, March 1976:26 
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To compensate for estate administration costs would also delay 
the finalising of a claim under the Act and to that extent would 
create administrative difficulty. 
Also the Commission as a general rule does not pay the costs of 
travelling expenses outside New Zealand. To do so would establish 
an expensive precedent difficult to justify in terms of a 
publicly funded scheme. 
Next excluded from recovery under Section 121 l is "any expense 
or loss arising from damage in respect of which, or to the extent 
to which, no payment is to be made" under Section 110 l or lA 
In other words, section 121 cannot operate to override a refusal 
to pay compensation, or a limitation on its quantum which occurs 
in the provisions concerning damage to natural teeth, or artificial 
limbs and aids, clothing or spectacles being used or worn by the 
claimant at the time of the accident. 
This exclusion was also added to the Act by the amendment of 
1975. It serves to stress the principle that it is not the proper 
function of the Act to provide compensation for property damage 
and that what is listed in section 110 as compensatable is to be 
strictly followed and not extended. 
The fourth exclusion concerns the loss of opportunity to make a 
profit. The position at common law was that a person injured or 
killed by the negligence of another could claim for loss of futur e 
profits in addition to loss of future income . 
- 21 -
However an action at common law for such damages is excluded 
by section 5, while exclusion d of section 121 1 precludes 
it from cover under the Act. 
Common Law and the Act are based on different attitudes as to the 
quantum of compensation. 
The principle of tort damages was that the plaintiff should be 
able to receive full compensation for his loss, although it should 
be noted that this ideal was rarely achieved. Under the Act, the 
aim of compensation is to cushion the loss, but not fully compensate 
for it. 
The Act provides for compensation for loss of earning capacity in 
section 113 and loss of potential earning capacity in section 118 
but not for dividends nor, gnerally speaking, for gratuitous 
income. In this regard the compensation provided by the Act falls 
short of the remedies available at common law, yet Section 5 
precludes claimants from that more favourable remedy. 
Several claims concerning farming partnerships' expenses have gone 
to review hearings on the question of the appropriate measure of 
compensation where one partner is injured and replacement labour 
must be hired. 
Basic to such a claim, is the principle of Allen v. Dixon 47 where 
the Court of Appeal decided in a claim for general damages in 
common law that the cost of replacement labo ur is a partnership 
loss and that the plaintiff could not recover as general damages 
47 1973 2 NZLR 496 
- 22 -
an allowance for these costs in excess of his share of the 
expenses. 
Payment of replacement labour charges can be considered under 2 
sections : 
either section 121 1 as an "actual and reasonable expense and 
proved loss necessarily and directly resulting from an injury or 
death," 
or section 113 as a measure of the loss of earning capacity for 
the purpose of calculating earnings related compensation. In the 
case of a self-employed person, this calculation is made on the 
basis of average weekly earnings for the financial year last ended 
before the date of the accident. Loss of earning capacity canno t 
exceed relevant earnings for the purposes of the Act. Therefore 
the cost of replacement labour is not pertinent to the question 
of the claimant's earnings, and is not covered by Section 113. 
The additional expense, i.e. the difference between E.R.C. and 
the cost of hired labour, could be covered by section 121 1 if 
it were construed merely as a non-earnings related expense arising 
from the injury. The Commission, however, has treated such an 
expense as a business expense which has the effect of reducing 
the applicant's profit. The loss of opportunity to make a profit 
is expressly excluded by section 121 1 d Therefore as a 
general rule busine s s expe ns e s wo n 't b e paid und e r th i s s ection ; 
and more speci f ically , payme nt o f r e pl a c e me nt labour c o s ts will not 
be met by the section. 
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Conside r the hypothetical case o : a share milker incapac itate d 
by injury for 6 months. His las t year's earnings were $2,400. 
The costs of replacement labour ~Jr the 6 months amount to $2,600. 
Not only has the milker lost the J pportunity to make a profit, 
he has because of his injury mad a real loss, even if his so 
called profit is taken over the J l e year. What does the Act 
of fer him? The Commission see s - .is partnership as a business 
concern and the cost of replacew : t labour as a business expense, 
and therefore any income from t h business is seen as profit, 
or failure to get income is seen a s a loss of opportunity to make 
a profit. 
121. 
Under this head it is excluded from cover unde r section 
It seems anomalous that in such a case where the income from the 
sharemilking is equivalent to the individual's earnings and it 
is his livelihood, that be the c a tegorisation of his earnings 
as "profits" he is precluded fr om cover under the Act, and is lef t 
to live off a minus income. The inequity is more obvious if it i s 
compared with the situation of a wage earner who is not o n l y abl e 
to recover his E.R.C. but also the cost of hiring labour fo r any 
other necessary activity he is prevented from performing by his 
injury. Consider the case of a carpenter incapacitate d from wo r k 
for 5 months. 48 He was paid E. R.C. and recovered the expen s es o f 
hired labour to perform heavy work, includi ng the pouring of 
concrete, on a house he was bui l jing for hims e lf. 
48 A.C. Appeal Autho r ity , r e M~~inkovich A. C. C. Repor t Novl976 : 6S 
U,.. W LIBRARY 
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Although on policy grounds the Commission cannot possibly entertain 
the idea of maintaining high profit levels for a thriving company, 
there should be room for a more accommodating approach to be 
adopted where "profits" are synonymous with wages or earnings. 
Such an approach is within the purpose and the words of the Act, 
and to perpetrate such an anomaly on a mere technicality of inter-
pretation thereby ignoring a basic aim of the ltt, viz to provide 
the incapacitated worker automatically with earnings related 
compensation, is difficult to justify. 
Also excluded from recovery under section 121 are losses arising 
from an inability to perform a business contract where the 
inability arises from a personal injury by accident. 
Section 2 of the Act defines "business" by reference to section 2 
of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954. It covers ". . . . . any 
profession, trade, manufacture or undertaking carried on for 
pecuniary profit." 
A.A.P. Willy 49 argues that because carrying on a business for 
the purpose of the Land & Income Act necessitates a degree of 
continuity and comprehends more than an isolated act, a business 
contract must be taken as one which relates to a series of trans-
actions, therefore section 121 l e could not apply to a contract 
relating to an isolated transaction. 
49 "The Accident Compensation Act arrl Recovery for Losses arising from Personal Injury and Death by Accident." N.Z.U.L.R. Vol.6. 1975;250 
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With respect, it is submitted that Willy is wrong. Whe r e there 
is a business contract which relates to an isolated transaction 
and which cannot be performed because of a personal injury by 
accident, the Commission must apply the provisions of the Act 
as they stand and the relevant provision clearly states that any 
loss arising from the inability to perform a business contract 
cannot be recovered. There is no room for the exercise of a 
discretion as to payment. 
Payment under section 121 1 is personal to the claimant who has 
suffered personal injury by accident, or, in the event of his 
death, to his administrator. It can therefore be seen that the 
"any loss" of this exception, clearly means any loss suffered by the 
injured or deceased person and not any loss that may be suffered 
by another party to the contract. 
In the situation where a contract is breached because of an 
accidental injury, and the injured person has to pay damages 
to a third party for that breach, he could not recover that cost 
under the Act because of this exception. Likewise a third party 
could not get compensation under the Act because of this provision , 
even if payments under the subsection were not personal to the 
injured person. Nor could he seek a remedy for damages at 
common law as this is precluded by section 5. 
Again financial considerations were, it is submitted, partly 
responsible for this he a d b e ing excluded fr om cove r under section 
121. 
(i) 
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To accept responsibility for losses from non-performance of 
business contracts would be to lay the fund open to claims far 
above the extent of tis resources. Also the Act is a social 
welfare scheme, operating at the level of people and compensating 
them for injuries and lost incomes. Business interests, like 
property interests, are not within its scope. 
The next type of loss exclueded by section 121 concerns "any loss 
that has not for the time being actually occurred, whether or 
not the amount thereof is ascertainable before it occurs." 
This serves to reiterate the prerequisite for recovery under 
section 121 that the expenses must be actual. According to the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary 'actual' means something which exists 
in fact, or is real. 
Potential losses cannot be recovered under this section, although 
elsewhere in the Act there is specific provision made for such 
losses. 50 
It is submitted that this loss must be to the injured or deceased 
person, and does not refer to loss to a third party. 
The Act operates as a Social insurance scheme and consonant with 
that role, it does not undertake to meet potential and future 
losses apart from those expressly provided for elsewhere in the 
Act. 
50 Section 118 provides for compen s ation for loss of potential earning capacity. 
• 
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Unlike the common law action which made one assessment of the 
damages recoverable by a plaintiff, the Act provides on-going 
compensation and where a claimant incurs some loss after his 
original claim has been lodged or satisfied, he is able to apply 
for recovery of that expense. So this exclusion only bars recovery 
until such time as the loss has occurred. 
The last exclusion is of "any expense or loss in respect of or 
towards payment of which compensation is otherwise payable under 
this Act." This exclusion is reinforced by section 121 lA which 
goes a step further and refuses payment for any expense or loss 
similar in nature to an expense or loss for which compensation is 
payable under any other provision of the Act. 
These provisions merely reiterate tratdouble recovery will not 
be made under the Act even though two or more sections may be 
interpreted as covering one aspect of a claim. Double recove ry 
was also avoided in common law assessments of damages. 
This exclusion relates equally to pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
losses, although the existence of some doubt as to whe t her the 
latter are included under section 121 has already been alluded to. 
Two further heads of damages available at common law require 
mention; theyare exemplary damages and aggravated damages. There 
is uncertainty in the area of exemplary damages after Roo ke s v 
Barnard 
Press Ltd 
51 
52 
1964 
1969 
and the Privy Council's decision in Australian Co nso l idatec 
52 
v. Uren. 
A.C. 1129 
A.C. 590 
-
• 
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However using Fogg v McKnight
53 
as authority, it can be said that 
exemplary damages have be e n awarde d in New Zealand in a case 
involving personal injury. The basis of an award of exemplary 
damages is to punish the defendant, so these damages cannot fit 
into the requirement of section 121 as being compensation for 
"a proved loss necessarily and directly resulting from the injury." 
They are not recompense for a loss suffered by the injured person, 
so no compensation will be awarded under section 121. An action 
under this head at common law is precluded by section 5. The 
same is true of a claim to recover aggravated damages arising out of 
personal injury by accident. Aggravated damages were described in 
Fogg v McKnight by McGregor J. as truly compensatory. If this 
description is correct, as the writer submits it is, the way is 
clear to claim compensation on this head under section 121 1, 
since the claimant has lost something as a direct result of his 
injury. There is nothing in the section to support the view that 
proved losses must also be of a pecuniary nature, therefore on 
the basis of the provision as written the claim should succeed . 
Section 121 does not aim to provide compensation for all losses 
and expenses which are consequent upon injury or death. It 
establishes definite criteria to be satisfied before compe nsation 
will be awarded, and lists classes of exceptions where no compen-
sation will be paid. Should there exist some situation where a 
substantial claim is made which satisfies the prerequi s ites of 
section 121 1 and is not excluded by section 121 1 a - g, the 
Commis s ion still has a doub l e d i sc re tion("may pay " and "suc h a mount 
(if any ) a s it th ink s fit") t o exercise where to pay Compensation 
woul d produce a result not in tended o r f oreseen by the l egislation . 
53 1968 NZLR 330 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Most of the major heads of losses recove rable at 
common law are now covered under the Act, but not 
2. 
all of them. The exclusions of section 121 place some 
parameters on the scope of compensation under the Act. 
The reason for the inclusion of such a provision as 
section 121 in a social welfare scheme rests on the 
acceptance of the fact that the prime need in such a 
scheme is to ensure that these persons in need as a result 
of accidents should have their income maintained at a level 
not too far below that of their previous earnings. As part 
of this aim, expenses arising solely as a result of the 
injury should be met. 
The Act purports to supplant common law claims for personal 
injury by accident. To allow a contemporaneous action at 
common law for some aspect of the personal injury not 
covered under the Act would have meade no sense, administra -
tively, cost-wise, or logically. Not to allow such an 
action(by express legislative prohibition) for an as pect 
not covered by the Act but formerly remediable at common 
law would not have been equitable. The solution to thi s 
problem was to include in the Act provision for recovery o f 
expenses "arising necessarily and directly from the injury ." 
3. In section 121 there are presently some difficulties with 
the wording and its inte rpre tation. In some case s th i s meanc 
that the s e ction is be ing a pp lied i n a way i nc ons i stent 
e ithe r with the language o f the s ta t ute or , in other cases , 
with the purpos es of th e Act . The s itua tion call for 
l o~i ~l ~ rive remedy . 
• 
APPENDIX 
A. 
2 
The text of the remainder of section 121 of the Act 
is as follows : 
Where a person suffers personal injury by accident in 
respect of which he has cover under this Act, or where a person 
dies as a result of personal injury so suffere d, the Commission 
having regard to any other compensation payable, may -
a Pay to any member of the household of which the injured 
or deceased person was a member on the date of the 
accident such compensation as the Commission thinks fit 
for any quantifiable loss of service proved to have 
been suffered by the person to whom the payment is made 
as a result of the injury or death for such a period 
as the Commission thinks fit, not being longer than 
the period for which that member could reasonably 
expected to receive the service: 
b Pay to any person, or to the administrator of the person, 
such compensation as the Commission thinks fit for any 
identifiable actual and reasonable expenses or losses 
incurred by the person in giving help to the injured 
person while he is suffering from incapacity resulting 
from the injury or in taking any necessary action 
following and consequential upon the death of the 
injured perso n . 
3 Where a person suffers pe rsonal injury by accide nt in 
respe ct of which he has cove r unde r this Act and the in jury 
i s o f such a nature that he mu s t have c ons tant pe rsonal attention , 
~ 
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the Corrunission, having regard to ~,y other compensation payable , 
may pay to that person, or if it -,inks fit to the administrator 
of that person, in addition to ~~ other compensation and 
rehabilitation assistance to whic he may be entitled, such 
amounts as the Commission from t ~ e to time thinks fit in respect 
of the necessary care of the per~,~ in any place of abode or 
institution. 
4 Where a person dies as a r~sult of personal injury by 
accident in respect of which her.as cover under this Act, and 
any superannuation, pension, or annuity terminates or is reduced 
upon his death, if in the opinion of the Corrunission any dependant 
of the person, being a dependant who was dependent through him on 
that superannuation, pension, or annuity immediately before the date 
of the death, suffers any loss of support by reason of the termin-
ation or reduction thereof, the Corrunission having regard to any 
other compensation payable and to the circumstances of the 
dependant and to any other relevant circumstances, may pay to that 
dependant such compensation as i t thinks fit in respect of the 
loss which in the opinion of the Corrunission is so suffered for 
such period as it thinks fit, not being a period extending beyond 
the shortes of the folowing periods: 
a  A period equal to the expectation of life of a normal 
person of the same age and sex as the d eceased person; 
or 
b The period for which earnings relate d compensation 
would be payable to the dependant under subsection 
(2) of section 128 of thi s Act if that subse ction 
applie d to the  dependant; or 
{i) 
)> 
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c Any period other than the lifetime of the deceased 
person for which the superannuation, pension, or 
annuity would have contiuned if the deceased person 
had not died. 
This section was brought into force on l April 1974; see S.R. 
1973/290/2. Subss. l and la were substituted for the original subs. l bys. 22 1 of the Accident Compensation Amendment Act 
1975. 
In subs. 2 b the words "or losses" were inserted by s. 22 2 
of the Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1975. 
B. The original text of section 121 of the Act 
read: 
Compensation for Pecuniary Loss not Related to Earnings 
121, Compensation for pecuniary loss not related to earn-
ings - 1 Where a person suffers personal injury by accident 
in respect of which he has cover under this oct, or where a 
person dies as a result of personal injury so suffered, the 
Commission shall pay to him, or in the event of his death to 
his administrator, in addition to all other compensation and 
rehabilitation assistance to which he is entitled under this 
Act, compensation of such amount as the Cornmission may fix for 
actual and reasonable expenses and proved losses necessarily 
and directly resulting from the injury or death, not being-
a Damage to property; or 
b The loss of an opportunity to make a profit; or 
c Any loss arising from inability to perform a business 
contract; or 
2 
d Any loss that has not for the time bing actually 
occurred, whether or not the amount thereof is 
ascertainable before it occurs; or 
e Expenses in or towards payment of which compensation 
is otherwise payable under this Act. 
Where a person suffers personal injury by accident in 
respect of which he has cover under this Act, or where a person 
dies as a result of personal injury so suffered, the Commission 
having regard to any othercompensation payable, may-
a Pay to any member of the household of which the injured 
deceased person was a member on the date of the accident 
such compensation as the Commission thinks fit for any 
quantifiable loss of service proved to have been suffered 
b 
by the person to whom the payment is made as a result of 
the injury or death for such period as the Commission 
thinks fit, not being longer than the period for which that 
member could reasonably have expected to receive the service: 
Pay to any person, or to the administrator of the person, 
such compensation as the Commission thinks fit for 
any identifiable actual and reasonable expenses incurred 
by the person in giving help to the injured person while 
he is suffering from incapacity resulting from the injury 
or in taking any necessary action following and cons equential 
upon the death of the injured person. 
3 Where a person suffers personal injury by accident in 
respect of which he has cover under this Act and the inj ury is of 
such a nature that he must have constant personal attention, 
-
- 5 '"' 
the Commission, having regard t c an y other compensation paya b l e , 
may pay to that person, or if i t thinks fit to the administrator 
of that person, in addition to c~ l other compensation and 
rehabilitation assistance to wh h he may be entitled, such 
amounts as the Commission from ~ ~e to time thinks fit in respect 
of the necessary care of the pe J n in any place of abode or 
institution. 
4 Where a person dies as a result of personal injury by 
accident in respect of which he ~as cover under this Act, and 
any superannuation, pension or a~nuity termina tes or is 
reduced upon his death, if in t ne opinion of the Comrnission any 
dependant of the person, being a dependant who was dependent 
through him on that superannuation, pension, or annuity imrnediately 
before the date of the death, su f fers any loss of support by 
reason of the termination or redJction thereof, the Commission 
having regard to any other compe ,s ation payable and to the circum-
stances of the dependant and to ~ny other relevant circumstance s, 
may pay to that dependant such c mpensation as it thinks fit in 
respect of the loss which in the opinion of the Commission is so 
suffered for such period as it t h i nks fit, not being a period 
extending beyond the shortest of the following periods: 
a A period equal to the e xpectation of life of a normal 
person of the same a g 2 and sex as the deceased person; 
or 
b The period for which _ rnings related compensation wou ld 
be payable to the dep ,dant under subsection 2 o f s e c tion 
128 of this Act if t h ~ subs ec tion appl ied to t he 
de pe ndant; or 
~ 
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c Any period other than the lifetime of the deceased 
person for which the superannuation, pension, or 
annuity would have continued if the deceased person 
had not died. 
{i) 
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